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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellant,

Case No. 20000680-CA

v.
JOSE MORALES-TORRES,

Priority No. 2

Defendant/Appellee.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
The State appealsfromthe district court's quashal of one count of arranging to
distribute controlled substances (cocaine), a second degree felony, in violation of UTAH
CODE ANN. § 58-37-8-(l)(a)(ii) (1998 & Supp. 2000). This Court has jurisdiction under
UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-18a-l(2)(a) (1999) and UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (1996).
ISSUE ON APPEAL, PRESERVATION, AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
Issue. Did the district court erroneously quash the bindover order on a charge of
arranging to distribute a controlled substance in the face of evidence from which a trier
of fact could reasonably infer that defendant intended to arrange for the undercover
officers to purchase cocaine?
Preservation. This issue was preserved by the district court's granting of the
motion to quash the bindover order (R. 113-118).
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Standard of Review. "[T]he ultimate decision of whether to bind a defendant
over for trial presents a question of law" which is reviewed "de novo without deference."
State v. Hutchings, 950 P.2d 425, 429 (Utah App. 1997); State v. Jaeger, 896 P.2d 42,
43 (Utah App. 1995).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
Any pertinent constitutional provisions, statutes and rules are quoted below:
Except as authorized by this chapter, it is unlawful for any person to
knowingly and intentionally: . . . distribute a controlled or counterfeit
substance, or to agree, consent, offer, or arrange to distribute a controlled
or counterfeit substance.
UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-37-8(l)(a)(ii) (1999 & Supp. 2000).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant was charged with arranging to distribute cocaine, a second degree
felony (R.2-5). The preliminary hearing was held on 6 April 2000 and defendant was
bound over as charged (R. 131:18) (a complete copy of the transcript is contained in
addendum A). Thereafter, on 7 June 2000, defendant moved to quash the bindover in
district court, claiming that the State had failed to establish a prima facie case of
arranging under State v. Hester, 2000 UT App 159, 3 P.3d 725, cert, denied, 9 P.3d 170
Utah 2000), which was issued on 2 June 2000 (R. 35-40) (copies of the motion and
supporting memorandum are contained in addendum B). The State filed a
memorandum opposing the motion and distinguishing Hester (R. 91) (a complete copy
of the State's opposing memorandum is contained in addendum C). The district court
2
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'

granted defendant's motion and entered an order quashing the bindover order (R. 113114) (a copy is contained in addendum D). An order of dismissal was entered thereafter
(R. 118-119). The State timely appealed (R. 120).
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
On 8 March 2000, Officer Portel of the Salt Lake City Police Department was
working in an undercover narcotics operation in the downtown area (R. 131: 4).
Specifically, Officer Portel and another undercover officer watched defendant and two
other males standing by a pay phone located at 575 West and 200 South, in Salt Lake
City Utah, leave and return within a 30 minute time frame (R. 131: 5-6). After observing
this conduct, the officers pulled over next to the sidewalk and Officer Portel, the
passenger, gave defendant a "nod," a method of communication Officer Portel uses to
contact drug dealers (R. 131:6-7). Defendant nodded back to Officer Portel and
approached the truck (R. 131: 7). Officer Portel asked defendant if he could "hook
[them] up" (id.). When defendant asked what they needed, Officer Portel said "Coca,"
meaning Cocaine (R. 131: 8). Defendant then asked for thirty-five cents to use the pay
phone, which Officer Portel declined to give him (id.). Instead, Officer Portel offered to
let defendant use her cellular phone and he accepted (R. 131: 8-9).
%

With Officer Porters help, defendant called a pager number and then waited for a

return call (R. 131: 9). Within one minute the cell phone rang and defendant had a
conversation in Spanish with the caller (id.). Officer Portel does not speak Spanish and

3
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

did not understand the phone conversation (R. 131:9, 16). When defendant finished the
call, he said they needed to drive to 700 South and 900 West because the man who had
the drugs was at that location eating lunch and he wanted them to drive out there to meet
him (R. 131: 9). Defendant asked to ride with the officers, but the officers would not
allow him to get in their truck (R. 131: 10). Officer Portel asked if the other man could
meet them at their present location, or if the officers could meet the man without
defendant (id.). Defendant, however, insisted on going, stating that the dealer knew him
and would not deal with the officers without him (id.). When Officer Portel declined to
participate in the deal, defendant walked away (R. 131: 11). Shortly thereafter, he was
arrested (id.).
After observing defendant's arrest, the undercover officers drove to 700 South
and 900 West to meet the dealer (R. 131: 12). Officer Portel used the same cellular
phone she had loaned to defendant and hit redial (R. 131:13). She observed that "there
was a guy standing in the parking lot, picked (sic) up the phone and started talking on it,
so we said, 'Oh, that's him'" (id.). The dealer then approached the officers truck and
said, "Oh, are you guys looking for somethingf?]" (id.). Thereafter the officers

{

purchased narcotics from the dealer (id.).
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
• i

Evidence presented at the preliminary hearing established that defendant used a
cellular phone belonging to two undercover officers to contact a cocaine dealer on their
(

4
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behalf, and also arranged a meeting with the dealer at a specified downtown location.
Further, defendant asked to accompany the officers to the location in order to complete
the transaction, but was refused. Thereafter, defendant walked away and was arrested.
Meanwhile, the officers traveled to the meeting location where they identified the dealer
by hitting redial on their cell phone, and watching to see who responded to the call.
Thereafter, they completed the drug transaction with the dealer. Viewing this evidence
in the light most favorable to prosecution and drawing all inferences in favor of the
prosecution, defendant should have been bound over on a charge of arranging to
distribute cocaine.
ARGUMENT
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRONEOUSLY QUASHED THE
BINDOVER ORDER ON A CHARGE OF ARRANGING TO
DISTRIBUTE A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE DESPITE
EVIDENCE FROM WHICH A TRIER OF FACT COULD
REASONABLY INFER DEFENDANT'S INTENTION TO
ARRANGE FOR THE DISTRIBUTION OF COCAINE
The district court's quashal of the bindover order on a charge of arranging to
distribute controlled substance on these facts misapprehends what is required by the
bindover standard, the arranging statute, UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-37-8(a)(l)(ii) (Supp.
1998), and State v. Hester, 2000 Utah App 159, 3 P.3d 725. The district court's
erroneous rulings quashing the bindover order and dismissing the information should
therefore be reversed.

5
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Bindover standard. At a preliminary hearing, "the prosecution must present
evidence sufficient for the magistrate to find [pjrobable cause to believe that the crime
charged has been committed and that the defendant has committed it." State v. Talbot,
972 P.2d 435, 437 (Utah 1998) (citations and internal quotations omitted).
"Furthermore, [t]he prosecution is not required to introduce enough evidence to establish
the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, but must present a quantum of evidence
sufficient to warrant submission of the case to the trier of fact." Id. (citations and
internal quotations omitted). This probable cause standard "is lower, even, than a
preponderance of the evidence standard applicable to civil cases." Id. (citations and
internal quotations omitted).
Moreover, "in determining whether this standard of probable cause has been
satisfied, the magistrate should view the evidence in a light most favorable to the
prosecution and resolve all inferences in favor of the prosecution." Id. at 437-38
(citations and internal quotations omitted). Additionally, "[ujnless the evidence is
wholly lacking and incapable of reasonable inference to prove some issue which supports
the [prosecution's] claim, the magistrate should bind the defendant over for trial." Id. at

{

438 (citations and internal quotations omitted). Finally, Utah law recognizes a
"presumption that the State will strengthen its evidence at trial." State v. Pledger, 896
P.2d 1226, 1230 (Utah 1995) (quoting Diaz v. State, 728 P.2d 503, 510 (Okla. Crim.
App. 1986)).
<
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Elements of Arranging to Distribute Controlled Substance. Defendant was
charged with arranging to distribute cocaine. A person commits the offense of arranging
if he knowingly and intentionally distributes a controlled or counterfeit substance, or
agrees, consents, offers, or arranges to distribute a controlled or counterfeit substance.
UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-37-8(l)(a)(ii) (1999 & Supp. 2000).
In Utah, "any witting or intentional lending of aid in the distribution of drugs,
whatever form it takes," amounts to the criminal offense of arranging. State v. Harrison,
601 P.2d 922, 923 (Utah 1979). See also State v. Pelton, 801 P.2d 184, 185 (Utah App.
1990) (recognizing that "any act in furtherance of 'arranging] to distribute . . a . . .
controlled substance' constitutes a criminal offense pursuant to the statute") (quotation
omitted), cert denied,

P.2d

(Utah February 21,1991). The "agreement" to

arrange distribution is thus the actus reus of the offense of arranging. State v. Scott, 732
P.2d 117,120 (Utah 1987). This is true even if nothing of value is ultimately exchanged
or distributed. Harrison, 601 P.2d at 924 n.5. Rather, "[a]ll that is needed is the
arrangement of such distribution, coupled with knowledge or intent." Id. See also State
v. Clark, 783 P.2d 68, 69 (Utah App. 1989).
Ruling below. The district court's quashal of the bindover order makes clear that
it found the evidence insufficient to establish that defendant agreed and/or intended to
arrange for the distribution of cocaine because

7
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(1) the conversation that defendant had with a so called dealer was not
understood by Officer Portel because it was in the Spanish language and
she did not understand what was said nor to whom;
(2) it was clear that defendant never had any drugs;
(3) defendant never mentioned] cocaine or any drug;
(4) police officers broke off negotiations with defendant and he walked off;
(5) officers made further contact with drug dealer(s) on their own,
conducted negotiations; and
(6) there was no evidence that defendant had anything to do with the
dealers that the officer eventually consummated a drug transaction
(R. 113-114), add. D.
Analysis. Contrary to the district court's reasoning, defendant's conduct clearly
falls within the wide range of culpable conduct prohibited in section 58-37-8(1 )(a)(ii).
Indeed, defendant's conduct reasonably suggests his agreement to arrange for the
distribution of cocaine even if he never had drugs on his person, never said the word
coca, or cocaine, and was ultimately cut out of the transaction before its completion. As
set out previously, nothing more than the agreement to arrange for the distribution is
required. Scott, 732 P.2d at 120; Clark, 783 P.2d at 69.

<

Viewed in the light most favorable to the State, evidence presented at the
preliminary hearing was sufficient to infer that defendant paged a cocaine dealer on the
officers' behalf (R. 131:8-10). Even though defendant's phone conversation was
conducted in Spanish, the reasonable inference is that the caller was the cocaine dealer
i
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defendant had just paged (id.). This is because the officers told him they wanted cocaine
immediately before defendant placed the page, and at the conclusion of the call,
defendant announced in English that he and the officers needed to travel to a specified
location to meet with the dealer to conclude the drug transaction (id.). Thus, while
defendant did not himself utter the words coca or cocaine, the reasonable inference is that
he arranged for the officers to purchase such. This inference is not negated by the fact
that defendant was "stopped short" of his intended purpose when the officers refused to
allow him to accompany them to the dealer's location. See Francis v. State, 890 S.W.2d
510, 513 (Tex. App. 1994) (affirming arranging conviction even though defendant was
inadvertently "stopped short of his intended purpose of an actual delivery"of controlled
substance).1
Because the district court failed to view the evidence in the light most favorable to
the prosecution and to draw the reasonable inference that defendant intended to arrange
for the distribution of cocaine, it erred as a matter of law in quashing the bindover order.
Hester distinguished. In addition to misapplying the bindover standard, the
district court also erroneously relied upon this Court's recent opinion in State v. Hester,

specifically, as in this case, Francis did not expressly state he had cocaine for
sale, but rather offered to obtain such when the undercover officers requested it. Id. at
513. While the officers agreed to let Francis accompany them to the location where he
claimed he could get "some," Francis unexpectedly opened the sliding door to the
surveillance van, exposing the surveillance team, before the transaction could be
completed. Id. at 511.
9
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2000 Utah App 159, 3 P.3d 725, Although the district court did not elucidate his reason
for relying on Hester (R. 113), Hester's resemblance to the case at bar is superficial.
In Hester, the State argued unsuccessfully in the preliminary hearing court and on
appeal that Hester should have been bound over on a charge of arranging because
"Hester told the undercover officer that he had cocaine, accepted money from the officer,
and told the officer to 'wait there.'" Id. at ^ 5. On appeal, this Court emphasized, on the
other hand, that Hester was arrested before the drug transaction was concluded, and
police found no cocaine on his person at that time. Id. at f 3. Additionally, Hester had
spoken to no one, nor had he made any phone calls after leaving the undercover detective
in that case. Id. Therefore, this Court found that there was "no particular indication that
[Hester] was going to meet a supplier or otherwise actually procure cocaine or arrange
for its delivery to [the undercover detective]." Id.
Rather than allowing events to unfold a while longer, the police moved to
quickly to apprehend Hester without even knowing if he had any controlled
substances on him (he did not), or if any other party was involved in the
transaction (none was identified), or if he had some other means to get the
cocaine delivered to [the undercover detective] (none was shown).
Id. at 14. The Court thus upheld the magistrate's refusal to bind over.
In so ruling, however, the Court acknowledged that, "Even absent proof of a
completed distribution, there are other types of evidence which can be used to reveal the
defendant's intent by showing that the defendant took active steps to facilitate the
completion of an illicit transaction." Id. at f 12. The Court further acknowledged that

10
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even an "aborted transaction can serve as the basis for an 'arranging' conviction, if the
surrounding facts indicate that the defendant intended to facilitate a completed drug
sale." Id. The problem in Hester, where there was no evidence of a completed sale, was
the State's failure to produce "evidence that Hester took active steps to facilitate the
distribution of cocaine[.]" Id. at ^ 13. In a footnote, the Court indicated that
Such evidence could include that Hester made phone calls seeking drugs,
drove around looking for drugs, commented to Cardon on how the drugs
were to be acquired, was seen conferring with known drug suppliers, or
was shown to be a iink in a chain' of distribution.
Id. at ^f 13, n.6 (citations omitted).
Here, unlike Hester, the State presented evidence that defendant not only took
active steps to facilitate the distribution of cocaine, but was also a critical "link in a
chain"of distribution leading to the completed transaction. Id. at ^| 12 (citation omitted).
Indeed, as set forth previously, defendant facilitated the transaction by paging the dealer,
arranging a meeting, and providing the dealer's location to the undercover officers (R.
131:8-10). Moreover, the transaction in this case was ultimately completed despite
defendant's absence, precisely because he had already told the officers where to find the
dealer, and because the officers were able to redial on their cell phone the same pager
number defendant initially used to contact the dealer (R. 131: 9,13). Given these
distinctions, illustrating that what was absent in Hester was present here, the district
court erroneously relied on Hester to quash the bindover order.

11
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Finally, defendant's conduct is not analytically distinguishable from that of the
defendant in Pelton. Like Pelton, defendant "was one link in a chain of events," which
eventually led to the sale of cocaine. Id. at 185. Pelton directed an undercover agent to
drive to a 7-Eleven store where they were to make a phone call and then "'the man would
bring the cocaine to that location.'" Id. Once at the 7-Eleven, Pelton and another
individual got out of the car and spoke to a man in a telephone booth, who turned out to
be the dealer. Id. Pelton, however, did not further participate in the drug transaction,
which was "consummated" only after he left the area. Id. This means that Pelton, like
defendant, never possessed the cocaine at issue, never discussed prices or handled
money, and was not present at the time of the purchase. Id. at 185-186. Therefore,
defendant's conduct in similarly linking up the officers in this case with a cocaine dealer
is as culpable as that of Pelton's, who was ultimately convicted for arranging under the
higher, reasonable doubt standard applicable at trial. See also State v. Gallegos, 851
P.2d 1185, 1189-90 (Utah App. 1993) (affirming conviction for arranging based solely
on Gallegos' representations as to the availability of narcotics made over the telephone to
potential buyers); Clark, 783 P.2d at 70 (affirming arranging conviction in absence of

(

completed transaction where defendant made incriminating statements to undercover
officers, attempted to contact dealer, was present during negotiations with dealer, and
warned of a tailing car).

i

12
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

At the preliminary hearing, the State presented abundant evidence which, when
viewed "in a light most favorable to the prosecution" was not "wholly lacking and
incapable of reasonable inference to prove" that defendant agreed to arrange the
distribution of cocaine. Talbot, 972 P.2d at 437-38. The district court thus erred in
quashing the bind over order.
CONCLUSION
The district court's orders quashing the bindover order and dismissing the
information should be reversed and the case remanded for entry of an order binding
defendant over for trial on a charge of arranging to distribute cocaine.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED on £_ December 2000.
JAN GRAHAM
Utah Attorney General

MARIAN DECKER
Assistant Attorney General
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1

IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT - SALT LAKE CITY

2

SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OP UTAH

3

-oOo-

4

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

5
6
7

Case No. 001904616
PRELIMINARY HEARING

vs.

(Videotape Proceedings)

JOSE MORALES-TORRES,
Defendant.

8

-oOo-

9
10
11

BE IT REMEMBERED that on the 6th day of April,

12

2000, commencing at the hour of 4:05 p.m., the above-

13

entitled matter came on for hearing before the HONORABLE

14

SHEILA K. McCLEVE, sitting as Judge in the above-named

15

Court for the purpose of this cause, and that the

16

following videotape proceedings were had.

17

-oOo-

18

A P P E A R A N C E S

19

For the State:

MATTHEW G. NIELSEN
Deputy Salt Lake County
District Attorney
231 East 400 South
Salt Lake city, Utah
84111

For the Defendant:

JAMES A. VALDEZ
Attorney at Law
Salt Lake Legal Defender
Association
424 East 500 South, #300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

20
21
22
23
24
25

f iLED i-JST&CT COURT
Thifd Judicial District

OCT 15
,

/ - •

• - • : • •

- /

UWlCOUft of Appeal*
ALAN P. &AITH, CSR
MS BRAHMA DRIVE (801) 266-03J0

ORIGINAL
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U C T ? 3 2000
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*ww

P R O C E E D

1

TNGS

2

THE COURT: State vs. Morales-Torres, Jose

3
4

Morales-Torres.

MR. VALDEZ: That's mine, Judge. That's a quick

5
6

prelim, but—

7

THE COURT: But we don't have a prosecutor?

8

MR. VALDEZ: We don't have an interpreter.

9

THE COURT: We have~oh, you're doing it? Okay.

10

We just need an interpreter.

11

interpreter that was here?

We lost—who was the

Tell me that one was ordered.

MR. WILLIAMS: Why don't we call him out and

12
13

let's—ask him some questions, see—how is your English?

14

Is your English good enough that you don't need an

15

interpreter?

Huh?

16

MR. MORALES-TORRES:

17

MR. WILLIAMS: You don't think so.

18

MR. VALDEZ:

19

I don't think so.

I asked him, he said he didn't need

one.

20

THE COURT: Well—

21

MR. WILLIAMS: You don't need an interpreter or

22

you need one?

23

MR. MORALES-TORRES:

24

THE COURT: You don't need it?

25

MR. VALDEZ: Okay. Any problems, you let me

(Inaudible)

2
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

know, all right?
MR. MORALES-TORRES:
MR. VALDEZ:

Okay.

THE COURT:
Torres.

Uh huh.

Okay.

The same here, Mr. Morales-

You're—we can get an interpreter, we'll look for

one if you want to wait.
MR. MORALES-TORRES:
THE COURT: Okay.

No.

That's okay.

You understand?

MR. MORALES-TORRES:
THE COURT: Okay.

Yeah, I understand, Judge.
If you don't understand, you

just speak up.
MR. MORALES-TORRES:
THE COURT: Okay?
I guess.

Uh huh.

All right.

We don't need one,

If we can get one...
All right.

Let me go on the record then and say,

this is the State of Utah vs. Jose Morales-Torres, who's
present and—and uncuffed, so you can write a note there to
Mr. Valdez if you need to.
Mr. Valdez represents you and Mr. Nielsen's here
for the State. You have the second-degree felony,
distribution, offering, agreeing or arranging to distribute
and I'm assuming again, you waive reading of that.
MR. VALDEZ:

We do, Judge.

THE COURT: Okay.
MR. NIELSEN:

Go ahead, Mr. Nielsen.

Your Honor, the State would call
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Officer Portel.
THE COURT: All right*

Have her come forward and

be sworn.
Go ahead.

ANSELINE PQRTEL,
called as a witness by and on behalf of the State in this
matter, after having been first duly sworn, assumed the
witness stand and was examined and testified as follows:

DIRECT EXAMINATION
BY MRt NIELSEN;
Q

Officer, would you please state your full name,

spell your last and state with whom
A

you're employed?

Angeline Portel, P-o-r-t-e-1.

I'm a police

officer with Salt Lake City Police Department.
Q

And how long have you been so employed?

A

Three-and-a-half years.

Q

And have you had formal training in regard to

narcotics investigations?
A

I have.

Q

Okay*

Were you on duty on March 8th of the year

2000?
A

I was.

Q

Okay.

And did you have occasion to be in the

area of approximately 15—575 West 200 South?
A

Yes.

I was.
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Q

And what were you in that area for?

A

We were working in an undercover narcotics

operation, we were targeting street level narcotics
distribution in the downtown area.
Q

Okay.

Did you see a particular individual in

that area that caught you attention as being someone
involved?
A

Yes.

Q

Okay.

I noticed—I noticed Mr. Morales.
And is that person present in the

courtroom today?
A

He is.

Q

Would you point to him and describe what he's

wearing?
A

There, wearing that orange jumpsuit.
MR. NIELSEN:

May the record reflect

identification?
THE COURT: Yes.
MR. NIELSEN:
Q

Thank you.

(By Mr. Nielsen) And what was it that caught

your attention to the defendant?
A

When I saw him, he was standing at a pay phone at

that address with two white males that I had never seen in
the area before and I work in this area every day. And
they were making a phone call and then standing by the
phone, as if waiting for a call to be returned.
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And they

were there for quite some time.
Q

Okay.

Did at some point these three people

leave?
A

Yes. One of the white males left separately and

then one walked off later, in the same direction, with Mr.
Morales.
Q

Okay.

A

I did.

Did you later again see Mr. Morales?
I saw him about maybe 30 minutes later,

by himself, standing by the same pay phone.
Q

Okay. Was he using the phone?

A

No.

Q

Okay.

Did at some point you approach Mr. Morales

or did he approach you?
A

He was walking down the sidewalk starting to, you

know, leave the pay phone that he'd been standing by and we
pulled over next to the sidewalk and I kind of gave him a
head nod.
Q

Okay. Who was with you?

A

Officer Charman.

Q

And what kind of vehicle were you in?

A

We were in a Ford pickup truck.

Q

And were both of you undercover?

A

Yes.

Q

Plain clothes?

A

Yes.
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Q

Okay.

And you gave a head nod to Mr. Morales?

A

I did.

Q

And what did he do back?

A

He nodded to me, he stopped and walked over to

the truck.
Q

Okay.

Based on your experience and training,

what usually are head nods used for on the street?
A

They're just used by buyers to communicate with

drug dealers.

Frequently, you need to make some sort of

eye contact, head nod, wave.
MR. VALDEZ:

Well, I'll object to that

conclusion, I think she can testify as to what she uses it
for when she's working in an undercover capacity.
THE COURT:

You think she can testify to what?

MR. VALDEZ:

What she uses head nods for when

she's working in an undercover capacity, but everybody—
THE COURT: Oh.
MR. VALDEZ:

—nods their heads.

MR. NIELSEN:
Q

Q

All right.

(By Mr. Nielsen)
THE COURT:

Overruled.

Did you—

Overruled.

(By Mr. Nielsen)

Did you ask Mr. Morales

anything when he approached the vehicle?
A

I think that I asked him, Can you hook us up?

Q

Okay.

Were you the passenger in this truck?
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A

I was.

Q

Okay.

A

Yes.

Q

Okay.

And he approached the passenger side?

And what did he say after you asked hira if

he could—if he could hook you up?
A

He—he asked what we needed.

Q

And did you tell him?

A

I told him coca.

Q

Did—

A

Meaning cocaine.

Q

Did you tell him how much?

A

I don't remember.

Q

Okay.

A

Probably.

Q

Probably?

A

Probably, but I don't remember.

Q

Was this in English or Spanish?

A

English.

Q

Okay.

Was this in—

What was Mr. Morales' response to your

request for some coca?
A

He asked me for thirty-five cents for the pay

phone.
Q

And what did you tell him?

A

We didn't have any change with us, so we let him

use one of our cell phones.
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Q

Okay.

Did he in fact use that cell phone?

A

He did.

Q

And did he make a call on that?

A

Yes. He—I helped him, he—we paged a number

together on the police cell phone and waited for the call
to come back.

About 30 seconds later, the phone rang and

he had a conversation in Spanish with somebody.
Q

Were there any other phone calls or paging or

just that one paging and one returned call?
A

Just the one.

Q

Okay.

After he got off the phone, having the

conversation in Spanish, what did he do?
A

He told us that we needed to go to 700 South and

Ninth West and—because the guy that had the drugs was
eating lunch and he wanted us to drive out there and meet
him.
Q

Okay.

Did he specifically say that you would

have to meet the guy there for drugs or for cocaine or to
do the deal?

Do you remember what language h e —

MR. VALDEZ:
THE COURTS
Q

That's leading.

I will object.

Yeah.

(By Mr. Nielsen)

Do you remember what his

specific words were?
A

I—I think that he just said, we need to go to

that address and meet the guy 'cause he's eating right now
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and I don't think that he said anything specifically about
drugs or cocaine at that point.
Q

Okay.

What did you tell Mr. Morales at that

point?
A

Well, we have a rule where we can't—we can't

ride with the guy that's going to set us u p —
MR. VALDEZ:
THE COURT:
Q

That's non—that's non-responsive.
Sustained.

(By Mr. Nielsen) Okay.

What—what did you tell

Mr. Morales after he told you you'd have to go to that
other location?
A

I let him walk over to the truck and then Officer

Charman told him that we couldn't ride with him.
Q

Okay.

He wanted to get in the truck?

A

Yeah.

He wanted to get in the truck and ride

with us over there.
Q

Okay.

A

Mo.

Q

Okay.

Did, at any point, he get in the truck?

Did you tell him something in regard, that

you'd meet him somewhere or how were you going to meet at
the other location?
A

We tried to negotiate the deal where maybe we

could call the guy back and get him to come to where we
were and he didn't want to do that. And we said, well, can
we just go on our own and go meet him and he said that he
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had to come with us because the guy knows him, the dealer
would know him and not us.
Q

Okay.

Did he make any particular comments at any

time about what exactly would go on when you went to this
other location?
A

NO.

Q

And based on your conversations with Mr. Morales,

what was the reason for going—that you understood to be
for going to this other location?
A

To purchase cocaine.

Q

Okay.

And when these negotiations failed, what

then did you do?
A

We told him that we weren't going to do the deal

then, that we weren't going to drive out there and he said
okay and he walked up—down the sidewalk and we just had
him picked tip then.
Q

Okay.

Who picked him up?

A

Officer Smith and Officer Budea.

Q

Okay.

Did you see the officers when they picked

him up?
A

We did.

Q

So you maintained a visual on him the whole time?

A

We did.

Q

Okay.

So you were able to identify that the

person they stopped was in fact the same person who had—
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A

Yes.

Q

—been talking to you?

A

Yes.

Q

Okay.

What did they do with the defendant, do

you know?
A

They searched him real quick and then put him in

the back of the police, had him held in there for awhile.
Q

You had no more—

A

Before taking him to jail, I guess.

Q

You had no more involvement with him?

A

No.

Q

Okay.

I didn't.
Did you later look at the cell phone that

Mr. Morales had used?
A

Yes.

Q

Okay.

A

We decided that we were going to go to the

Seventh South Ninth West address.
Q

And that was because your conversation about the

meeting there?
A

Yeah.

Q

Okay.

A

He said that his dealer was there and since we

couldn't ride with him, we decided that we would just go
there on our own anyway and try to find the guy.
Q

Okay.

Did you go to that location then?
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A

Yes.

Q

Okay.

A

Yes. We did.

Q

How did you find that person?

A

The number that he paged on the cell phone was

Did you find anybody there?

saved in the cell phone's memory, so we just paged it
again.
Q

Okay.

A

And when—there was a guy standing in the parking

lot, picked up the phone and started talking on it, so we
said, Oh, that's him.
Q

So, you made eye contact with the person who

answered that number which you paged?
A

Yeah.

He approached our truck and he came over

and he said, Oh, are you guys looking for something and we
started working a deal with him and he said, yeah, you just
paged me.
Q

Okay*

A

So—

Q

And just—just briefly, was a drug transaction,

did a drug transaction later develop out of that incident?
A

Yes. It did.

Q

Okay.

A

Yes.

Q

Okay.

And narcotics were purchased?
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MR. NIELSEN:

I have nothing further, your Honor,

THE COURT: Mr. Valdez?
CROSS-EXAMINATION
3Y MRt VALDEZ;
Q

Did that latter drug transaction, was that

person—did that person look like he spoke Spanish?
A

Yes, he did.

Q

With the latter drug transaction that you made?

A

Yeah.

Q

Same phone number?

A

Yes, he did.

Q

The first guy that when he—when you called and

you said a guy picked it up and he came over to you, did—
is he a person that you think might speak Spanish?
A

Yes.

Q

Okay. And what was his name?

A

He was arrested and I think his name was Victor

Was he arrested?

Clinton.
Q

Okay. And he's listed on the Information; isn't

that correct?
A

Yes.

Q

Along with two other people?

A

Yes.

Q

Those other people are Ronald Wooley and Roger

Willy?
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A

Yes.

Q

Okay.

And do you see at least one of those

people in Court today?

Those—

A

Of the three you just listed?

Q

Yes.

A

No.

Q

You haven't seen any of them here today?

A

Oh, I've—yeah.

Q

Okay.

A

Mr. Willy.

Q

All right.

A

I guess.

Q

Now, Mr. Morales, you never gave him any money?

A

No.

Q

Okay.

We saw Willy.

He never gave you any—anything that might

look like a controlled substance?
A

No.

Q

Okay.

And then when you kept using the term

"dealer11, he never said "dealer11, did he?
A

I couldn't say.

Q

Okay.

Probably not.

He said something else, but you assumed it

was a dealer?
A

Right.

Q

Is that correct?

Or his dealer?

All right.

So, the negotiations you say broke off with him
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and he started walking away and then you had him arrested.
A

That's right.

Q

That was before anything else occurred with these

other individuals then; is that correct?
A

Yes.

Q

Okay.

You never used him to talk to those

individuals thereafter?
A

No.

Q

And apparently he was seated in the police car

when those other individuals were arrested?
A

Yes.

Q

Okay.

A

Very little.

Q

Okay.

You don't speak Spanish?

So you didn't know what he was talking

about when he was on the phone then; is that correct?
A

No.

I can't remember what he—he—it was a

conversation in Spanish and he turned away from me and I —
Q

You didn't hear it then?

A

NO.

Q

Now, all other—all other conversations with Mr.

Morales were in English?
A

Yes.

Q

And you used terms like, you asked him, "Can you

hook us up"?
A

Yeah.
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Q

Is that—is that the exact term that you used?

A

Probably.

Q

And—and I guess a response was, "For what"?

A

Coca.

Q

I mean, but his response was "For what"?
And you said—you said "Coca"?

A

What—I said coca.

He said, What do you need and

I said coca.
Q

Okay.

Did he ever use the word "coca"?

A

Unless he was talking to the guy on the phone,

the one—
Q

You didn't hear him use the word "coca"?

A

I don't think so*

Q

You're the one that used the word "coca"?

A

Uh huh.

Q

You're the one that used the word "hook—hook us

up" or the—the term "hook us up"?
A

Right.

Q

And I guess he, in some way, form or way, said to

you, I know somebody down the street?

At least later he

indicated he's down the street?
A

Right.
MR. VALDEZ:

That's all I have.

THE COURT: Anything else?
MR. NIELSEN:

No, your Honor.

17
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

THE COURT: Thank you.
MR. NIELSEN:

You may step down.

State would rest, your Honor.

MR. VALDEZ: We—we would rest, your Honor.
I'll indicate to Mr. Morales that he has the
right to make a statement.

I'll advise him not to make a

statement at this time. Will you take my advice?
You have the right to—you have a right to
testify.

It's my advice that you not testify.
Okay.

Take my advice?

MR. MORALES-TORRES:
MR. VALDEZ:

All right.

THE COURT: Okay.
MR. NIELSEN:

Yeah.
m

Submit it?

Submit it.

(Inaudible)
THE COURT: Well, let me, first, before you talk
about all that, find probable cause to believe that the
crime alleged here, Mr. Morales-Torres, was committed, the
offering—distribution, offering or agreeing or arranging,
a second-degree, and also reason to believe that you
committed the offense based upon the testimony.

So, I'm

going to order that you stand trial and that would be set
then for sentence—for sentencing—for scheduling, and I'm
going to again assume that you waive reading, enter not
guilty pleas for purposes of arraignment.
MR. VALDEZ: Yes.
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THE CLERK:

Before Judge Barrett, on April 17 at

8:30.
THE COURT: Okay.

On the 17th of April at 8:30

in the morning before Judge Barrett.
MR. VALDEZ:

Thank you, your Honor.

THE COURT: And we'll excuse you on that and you
can talk to him about—I think he was talking drug programs
or something.
MR. VALDEZ:

He was—yeah, he was talking

(inaudible)
MR. NIELSEN:

That's all I have, your Honor. May

I be excused?
THE COURT: Not that I wanted to hear.
You bet.

We'll excuse everybody.

We're in

recess.
(Whereupon, this hearing was concluded.)

*

# #
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TRANSCRIBER'S CERTIFICATE
STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

ss.
)

I, Toni Frye, do hereby certify:
That I am a transcriber for Alan P. Smith,
Certified Shorthand Reporter and a Certified Court
Transcriber of Tape Recorded Court Proceedings; that I
received an electronically recorded videotape of the within
matter and under his supervision have transcribed the same
into typewriting, and the foregoing pages, numbered from 1
to 19, inclusive, to the best of my ability constitute a
full, true and correct transcription, except where it is
indicated the Videotape Recorded Court Proceedings were
inaudible*
I do further certify that I am not counsel,
attorney or relative of either party, or clerk or
stenographer of either party or of the attorney of either
party, or otherwise interested in the event of this suit.
Dated at Salt Lake City, Utah, this 14th day of
October, 2000•

^

Transcriber

VM^£

Subscribed and sworn to before me this
of October, 2000.
NOTARY PUBLIC
ALAN P. SMITH
^ ? BRAHMA DRIVE
MURRAY, UT S4107
COMMISSION EXPIRES
DEC. 4, 2001
STATE OF UTAH

(

o
Notary Pub75T

S E A L )
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14th

day

REPORTERS CERTIFICATE
STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

)
:
)

ss.

I, Alan P. Smith, Certified Shorthand Reporter,
Notary Public and a Certified Court Transcriber of Tape
Recorded Court Proceedings within and for the State of
Utah, do certify that I received an electronically recorded
videotape of the within matter and caused the same to be
transcribed into typewriting, and that the foregoing pages,
numbered from 1 to 19, inclusive, to the best of my
knowledge, constitute a full, true.and correct
transcription, except where it is indicated the Videotape
Recorded Court Proceedings were inaudible.
I do further certify that I am not counsel,
attorney or relative of either party, or clerk or
stenographer of either party or of the attorney of either
party, or otherwise interested in the event of this suit.
Dated at Salt Lake City, Utah, this 17th day of
October, 2000*
NOTARY PUBLIC
ALAN P. SMITH
385 BRAHMA DRIVE
MURRAY. UT 84107
COMMISSION EXPIRES
DEC. 4, 2001
STATE OF UTAH

( S E A L )
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JAMES A. VALDEZ #3308
Attorney for Defendant
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOCIATION
424 East 500 South Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 532-5444
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE DIVISION

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

JOSE MORALES-TORRES
Defendant

MOTION TO QUASH BINDOVER
OR DISMISS.

CaseNo.001904616FS
CAO 00-00-5277
JUDGE WILLIAM BARRETT

The Defendant, JOSE MORALES-TORRES, by and through counsel, JAMES A.
VALDEZ, moves the Court to quash the bindover for trial which was granted April 6th, 2000,
based upon an opinion by the Utah Court of Appeals filed and released for publication on June
2nd, 2000, State v.Hester. 2000 UT App 159, (2000). A supporting Memorandum is filed
herewith.
DATED this 7^ day of June, 2000.

.DEZ #3308
iey for Jose Morales-Torres
MAILED/DELIVERED a copy otfhe foregoing to the Office of the District
Attorney, 231 East 400 South, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, this 7f day of June, 2000.
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JAMES A. VALDEZ # 3308
Attorney for Defendant
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOCIATION
424 East 500 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 532-5444
E-mail: ivaldez@sllda.com

9"

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE DIVISION

THE STATE OF UTAH,

MEMORANDUM AND SUPPORTING
AUTHORITY EN RE: MOTION TO
QUASH BINDOVER OR DISMISS.

Plaintiff,

v.
Case No. 001904616FS
CAO 00-00-5277
JUDGE WILLIAM BARRETT

JOSE MORALES-TORRES
Defendant

FACTS
Police officer Angeline Portal indicates in her police reports and testified at
Preliminary Hearing held on April 6,2000 before Honorable Sheila McCleve that she and
other officers were working in the area of 575 West 200 South when they seen the defendant
Jose Morales-Torres. She indicates "we approached him and asked him if he could, 'Hook us
up'. He laughed and walked over to the vehicle. He asked us what we needed and I told him I
wanted ' coca.' He asked me if I had thirty five cents for the pay phone." Officer Portal
testified and wrote in her report that they did not have any change but let him use their police
issued cell phone.

She then states" I told him if he got us a deal I'd give him ten

bucks." [Portal report]
She then walked with him and watched as he paged someone and received a return call a
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short time later wherein he conducted a conversation in Spanish which she (officer Portel) was
unable to understand. She further reports that he wanted a ride to a location at 700 South 900
West. The officers refused to give him arideand arrested him for arranging the sale of
narcotics.
Officers then went over to the a restaurant "El Popular" at 700 South 900 West and one
officer entered in an attempt to locate a "Dealer". None was located so Officers used a different
cell phone to call the numbers that were in the memory the cell phone that Morales had used.
They made contact with a Victor Clinton outside in the parking lot of "El Popular" Restaurant
who noticed that they were on the phone attempting to contact him. At the time he was
standing with Ronald Justo Woolery.
Police reports indicate that the negotiations involved Woolery as the main supplier of the
narcotic. Clinton was the contact to Woolery and Roger D. Willey was another buyer. [Sharman
report].
Negotiations were conducted with Woolery, prerecorded buy money was used to make
purchasefromWoolery and Clinton after some elaborate efforts at acquiring the substances and
transportation to yet other locations and eventually the deal was completed and the take down
officers notified and arrests made. Upon arrests being made of Woolery and Clinton some of the
pre-recorded buy money was located in Clinton'srightfrontpocket There is no indication as to
whether any of the arrested people other than Mr. Morales spoke Spanish.

ARQVMENT
THE PROSECUTION HAS NOT
ESTABLISHED THE QUANTUM OF
EVIDENCE NECESSARY TO BIND
OVER AS SET FORTH IN STATE v.

HgSTER,
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Mr. Morales-Torres did nothing more than furnish the undercover a pager and telephone
number. Once the officers arrested Mr. Morales, they conducted their own negotiations with
Woolery and in fact all remaining transactions did not involve Mr. Morales.
State v. Hester 2000 UT App 159, (2000) the defendant Tracy Raymon Hester was
contacted by an undercover police officer when the officer pulled up to a curb near where Hester
was standing and said something. When he walked over to the vehicle the officer asked Hester
if he had any Mchiva.'\ Hester's reply was "No, baby, I don't [;] only coke." took twenty
dollars from the officer told her to "wait there" and walked away. He was arrested and charged
with one count of arranging distribute a controlled substance.
At the conclusion of the Preliminary Hearing, defense counsel moved to dismiss on the
ground that the State had failed to present evidence sufficient even to support a reasonable
inference that Hester actually intended to arrange for the distribution of a controlled substanceas opposed to just stealing the officers money. The magistrate granted the defense motion and
refused to bind Hester over. The State appealed the dismissal and the Utah Court of Appeals
affirmed the magistrates decision.
To be guilty of arranging, the defendant must have committed some "act in furtherance of
arrangement" to distribute controlled substances. As part of its prima facie case of arranging, the
State must prove that the defendant acted with the knowledge or intent that his actions would
result in the distribution of a controlled substance.
Here police officers closed off any further discussions with Mr. Morales and arrested him.
They then made contact with the "Dealers" and conducted and concluded negotiations on their
own. Mr. Morales took no part in the completed distribution and the only active step that
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Morales can be shown to have taken was an unsuccessful phone call and his unwitting furnishing
of the phone number..
The court in Hester, in discussing whether intent to facilitate a drug transaction can
logically be inferredfromthe thin circumstantial evidence in the Hester facts said:
. . . "While it is sometimes subtle, there is in fact a difference
between drawing a reasonable inference and merely speculating
about possibilities. An inference is 'a conclusion reached by
considering other facts and deducing a logical consequence from
them/ Blacks Law Dictionary 781 (7th ed. 1999V Stated
another way,' [a]n inference is a deduction as to the existence
of a fact which human experience teaches us can reasonably
and logically be drawnfromproof of other facts/ Manchester
v. DucaiL 247 A.2d 827, 829 (Me. 1968). On the other hand,
speculation is defined as the4 act or practice of theorizing about
matters over which there is no certain knowledge.' Black's Law
Dictionary 1407 (7th ed. 1999).
In reality, there is no black line between inference and speculation
-both are way stations along a continuum that has absolute
Certainty at one extreme and complete impossibility at the other.
' When the correlation between the predicate facts and 'at some
point, the link between the facts and the conclusion becomes so\
tenuous that we call it "speculation."4" State v. Copas. 746 A. 2d
761,782 (Conn.2000) (Katz, J. Dissenting) (quoting Goldhirsh
Group, Inc. v. Alnert 107 F.3d 105.108 (2nd Cir. 199T> V

What if anything Mr. Morales said on the phone is unknown, because is was conducted in
Spanish and not understood by the officers. Additionally he was immediately arrested and made
to wait in custody for a long period of time whilst the officers made contact on their own,
conducted negotiations on their own, transported and traveled to other locations one their own,
and finally exchanged money with people other than Mr. Morales, on their own.

CONCLUSION
The Prosecution has failed to establish the quantum of evidence necessary to establish
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a prima facie case of arranging the distribution of a controlled substance, a second degree felony
in violation of Utah Code Ann. Section 58-37-8(1) (a)(ii) Supp. 1999). And pursuant to State v.
Hester. 2000 UT App 159, (2000). (Released for publication on June 2nd, 2000 after the
bindover).
Mr. Morales by and through his attorney James A. Valdez respectfully prays the
finding of probable cause and bindover be hereby quashed and the matter remanded to the
Magistrate Court for consideration and findings consistent with State v. Hester, or in the
alternative, PRAY that this Court make findings consistent with Hester, and dismiss the charges
against JOSE MORALES-TORRES with prejudice.

DATED this 26th day of June, 2000.

MAILED/DELIVERED a copy of the forgoing Memorandum to Matt Nielsen, Deputy
District Attorney, 231 East 400 South, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, this 26th day of June, 2000.
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DAVID E. YOCOM
District Attorney for Salt Lake County
KELLY R. SHEFFIELD, Bar No. 5869
Deputy District Attorney
231 East 400 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801)363-7900

Omtf^

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION
TO DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO
QUASH THE BINDOVER

-vsJOSE MORALES-TORRES,
Defendant.

Case'No. 001904616FS
CAO 00-00-5277
JUDGE WILLIAM BARRET

The State of Utah, by and through its counsel, David E. Yocom, Salt Lake County
District Attorney, and Kelly R. Sheffield, Deputy District Attorney, respectfully submits
this Memorandum in Opposition to the Defendant's Motion to Quash the Bindover.

FACTS
The defendant has been charged with Unlawful Distribution, Offering,
Consenting or Arranging to Distribute a Controlled or Counterfeit Substance. Utah Code
Ann. 58-37-8(l)(a)(ii) (1953). On March 08,2000, at 575 West 200 South, in Salt Lake
County, Officer Portel with the Salt Lake City Police Department was working on an
undercover narcotics operation targeting street level narcotics distribution in the
downtown area. Officer Portel made contact with the defendant after observing him and
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two other males standing near a pay phone. The defendant left with one of the males and
then returned to the area of the pay phone within 30 minutes. Officer Portel and Officer
Scharman, both undercover and in plain clothes, pulled over next to the sidewalk near the
defendant and gave him a nod, a method of communication Officer Portel uses as a buyer
to contact drug dealers. At that point, the defendant approached the vehicle where
Officer Portel asked the defendant if he could "hook us up." The defendant responded by
asking her what she needed, which she answered by requesting cocaine. The defendant
then asked for change to use the pay phone. When Officer Portel declined to give him
money, she offered to allow him to use her cellular phone. The defendant used the phone
and called a pager number and then waited for a call. Within one minute the phone rang
and the defendant had a conversation in Spanish. Officer Portel does not speak Spanish
and was unable to understand the phone conversation. When the defendant finished his
conversation, he stated that they needed to go to 700 South and 900 West because the
man who had the drugs was at that location eating lunch and he wanted them to drive out
there to meet him. The defendant wanted toridewith the Officers over to the other
location but was not allowed to enter the vehicle. Officer Portel began to negotiate the
deal so that the other man could meet them there or if the Officers could meet the other
man without the defendant. The defendant insisted on going stating that the other man
knew him and would not deal with the Officers without him. Officer Portel declined to
participate in the deal and the defendant walked away. The defendant was then picked up
by Officers Smith and Farillas.
After observing the arrest of the defendant, Officer Portel went to the location of
700 South and 900 West where the defendant had arranged the meeting between them
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and the man that would sell them cocaine. Officer Portel then used the cellular phone the
defendant had used and hit redial. She observed the man answering the page then
approached him and negotiated a drug deal. A drug sale resulted out of that transaction.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE STATE MET ITS BURDEN OF ESTABLISHING PROBABLE
CAUSE TO BELIEVE THE DEFENDANT COMITTED THE CRIME OF
UNLAWFULLY ARRANGING THE DISTRIBUTION OF A
CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE.

The magistrate properly bound this case over for trial. The magistrate does not
judge the merits of the case, but sits as a gatekeeper to the finder of fact. State v. Talbot,
972 P.2d 435 (Utah 1998). At the conclusion of testimony, any uncertainties created by
conflicting evidence concerning elements of the crime charged should be left for the fact
finder to resolve at trial. State v. Jaeger, 896 P.2d 42,45 (Utah Ct. App. 1995). The
magistrate has been directed by the Utah Supreme Court to evaluate the evidence in a
light most favorable to the prosecution and resolve all inferences in the prosecution's
favor. State v. Pledger. 896 P.2d 1226, 1229 (Utah 1995). Unless the evidence is wholly
lacking and incapable of reasonable inference to prove some issue which supports the
prosecution's claim, the magistrate should bind the defendant over for trial. Pledger, 896
P.2datl229.
The State's burden at a preliminary hearing is not a heavy one. '"The prosecution
is not required to introduce enough evidence to establish the defendant's guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt, but must present a quantum of evidence sufficient to warrant
submission of the case to the trier of fact.'" State v. Talbot. 972 P.2d 435, 437 (Utah
1998)(quoting Pledger. 896 P.2d at 1229). Furthermore, "this probable cause standard 'is
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lower, even, than a preponderance of the evidence standard applicable to civil cases.'"
Talbot, at 437 (quoting Pledger, at 1229).
Consequently, the State met its burden by producing sufficient evidence to
establish probable cause to believe the defendant committed the act of arranging the
distribution of a narcotic. Therefore, the defendant's Motion to Quash the Bindover
should be denied.
A.

The Prosecution Presented Sufficient Evidence to Establish Probable Cause to
Believe that the Defendant Committed the Act of Arranging the Distribution of a
Controlled Substance.
The defendant argues that the bindover should be quashed based on State v.

Hester. 2000 UT App 159 (2000), which dismissed a case on the grounds that the State
had failed to present evidence sufficient to support a reasonable inference that Hester
actually intended to arrange for the distribution of a controlled substance, as opposed to
just stealing the money. Hester, at 2, However, the Court in Hester, also stated that
"[t]he State could have met its burden either by producing evidence of a completed sale
of cocaine to [the officer] or evidence that Hester took active steps to facilitate the
distribution of cocaine, even if the distribution never actually occurred." Id. at 6.
Consequently, the facts in this case are distinguishable from Hester, in that the State
produced evidence that the defendant took active steps to facilitate the distribution of
cocaine.
Further, "[t]o be guilty of arranging, the defendant must have committed some
'act in furtherance of an arrangement' to distribute controlled substances." Hester, at 4
(quoting State v. Harrison. 601 P.2d 922, 923 (Utah 1979)). And, "the State must prove
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that the defendant acted with the knowledge or intent that his actions would result in the
distribution of a controlled substance." Hester, at 5.
Nevertheless, "[i]ntent to commit a crime can be 'inferred from the actions of the
defendant orfromsurrounding circumstances.'" Hester, at 5 (quoting State v. Murphy.
674 P.2d 1220, 1223 (Utah 1983)). And it is well settled that questions of intent are
strictly within the province of the jury. State v. Singer. 815 P.2d 1303, 1309 (Utah 1991).
In this case, the defendant asked Officer Portel what she wanted when she asked for a
"hook up". Officer Portel specifically asked the defendant for cocaine. In response to
Officer Porters request, the defendant made a call and set up a meeting at another /
location witir * m » who had the-cocainec The defendant made the phone call with t h y
intent » « t op a drag transactions This is further evidenced by the fact that the defendant
insisted on going with Officer Portel to the meeting and then commented that the deal
would not transpire without him since the dealer would deal only with him. The actions
of the defendant in making the phone call and setting up a meeting with a dealer at a
specific place shows the defendant intended to arrange a drug deal. Consequently, the
intent of the defendant to arrange the distribution of a controlled substance can be
inferred through his actions.
In addition, "there are other types of evidence which can be used to reveal the
defendant's intent by showing that the defendant took active steps to facilitate the
completion of an illicit transaction." Hester, at 5 (See State v. Galleeos. 851 P.2d 1185,
1187, 1190-91 (Utah Ct. App. 1993)). In Gallegos. the defendant made phone calls to
find dealers to provide controlled substances to callers. The Utah Court of Appeals stated
that the phone call making facilitated the illicit transaction. Also, when the defendant
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brings together a buyer and a seller, the Utah Court of Appeals called it a "link in a chain
of events." Hester, at 5 (quoting State v. Pelton. 801 P.2d 184, 185 (Utah Ct. App.
1990)). Thus, when the defendant in this case contacted the dealer, he became the link in
the chain of events, which facilitated the drug transaction that resulted and therefore the
defendant arranged the sale of drugs. The defendant brought the dealer and the Officers
into contact with each other, which facilitated the transaction and whereby the
defendant's intent can be inferred. Therefore, the facts in this case are different than in
Hester, such that the defendant in this case took steps to facilitate the drug transaction,
which establishes the quantum of evidence necessary to bind this case over for trial.

B.

The Proper Standard for this Case to be Decided Under is State v. Gray.

Even if this Court decides that the facts in this case are not distinguishable from
Hester, the State contends that the proper standard to decide this issue isfromthe Utah
Supreme Court in State v. Gray. 717 P.2d 1313 (Utah 1986). The Court in Hester.
dismissed the bindover because "the State's evidence would require the fact-finder to
speculate as to Hester's intent to arrange a sale." Hester, at 7. This would require the
State to offer evidence of the subjective intent of each defendant in every case, thm \

intent in this case.
Moreover, the State contends that under Gray, the subjective intent of each
defendant is irrelevant and the objective actions of the defendant should control instead.
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"We stated that any witting or intentional lending of aid in the distribution of drugs, in
whatever form the aid takes, is proscribed by the act." State v. Gray, 717 P.2d 1313,
1320 (Utah 1986). In Gray, the defendant was convicted under this statute for driving a
third party to the dealer's home to obtain drugs for the undercover agent and for puffing
the drug's quality. The Court held that the defendant's involvement was enough to
uphold the conviction.
In the case at bar, the defendant arranged a meeting between the dealer and
Officer Portel for cocaine. The defendant gave Officer Portel the number to the dealer
from which a drug transaction resulted. Consequently, the defendant's involvement was
the link that facilitated the drug transaction, which makes him culpable under this statute.
The defendant's actions aided in the distribution of the drugs, however unwitting his aid
might have been. Under an objective view of the defendant's actions, he aided in the
distribution of drugs. Therefore, the actions of the defendant objectively make him
culpable under this statute.
Further, "[w]e also pointed out that it is not necessary for the defendant to receive
any value in exchange for the drugs to be convicted under the statute." Id. at 1320.
Therefore, the defendant's intent can be inferredfromhis involvement in the transaction
even though he was not present during the transaction and he was not compensated.
"Were it otherwise, the arranging of drug sales would be perfectly legal, so long as it was
done gratuitously. The aim of the law is to make the arrangement of drug sales unlawful,
whether they be profitable or not." State v. Harrison. 601 P.2d 922,924 (Utah 1979).
Therefore, the defendant's actionfroman objective standard satisfy the elements
of the statute and proved sufficient evidence to bind the defendant over for trial.
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C.

The Defendant Was Properly Charged as Required bv State v. Hill.

The Utah Supreme Court in State v. Hill, required the State to charge the
defendant in that case under the Controlled Substances Act in the Utah Code where the
State charged Hill with theft by deception for selling baking soda to an agent claiming it
to be cocaine. 688 P.2d 450 (Utah 1984). The Court stated that when a statute governs
conduct then the defendant should be charged with that offense. In this case, the
defendant's actions are specifically proscribed by Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8 (l)(a)(ii)
(1953), where the defendant arranged the distribution of a controlled substance. The
defendant arranged a meeting between Officer Portel and a dealer and provided a number
by which a drug transaction transpired. "Consequently, where specific conduct is
proscribed by the Imitation Controlled Substances Act, its provisions should control as
mandated by § 58-37-19." State v. Hill 688 P.2d 450, 451 (Utah 1984). Further, "§ 5837-19 of the Controlled Substance Act is applicable to Chapter 37b offenses since the two
acts are integrally connected." Id. at 451. Therefore, the defendant's conduct in this act
meet the elements under this statute and so has been properly charged.

CONCLUSION
A magistrate should bind a defendant over for trial unless the evidence is wholly
lacking and incapable of reasonable inference to prove some issues, which supports the
prosecution's claim. Pledger. 896 P.2d at 1229. At the preliminary hearing, the State
produced evidence that the defendant made arrangements by telephone for a drug sale.
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The defendant called a dealer and provided a meeting place for the drug transaction to
take place. When the Officers refused to give the defendant a ride to the meeting, the
defendant stated that the transaction would only occur if he were present. Nevertheless,
the Officers used the number to the dealer provided by the defendant and went to the
place of the meeting provided by the defendant, which resulted in a drug sale. Therefore,
based on these facts, the objective actions of the defendant qualify him to be properly
charged under the distributing statute and the defendant's motion to quash the bindover
should be denied.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this \ \

day of July, 2000.
DAVID E.YOCOM
District Attorney

KELLER. SHEFFIELD
Deputy District Attorney
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Memorandum In
Support of the State's Motion in Opposition to the Defendant's Motion to Quash the
Bindover was delivered to JAMES A. VALDEZ, attorney for Defendant, JOSE
MORALES-TORRES, at 424 East 500 South, Suite 300, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 on
the ) 4 -

day of July, 2000.
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Addendum D
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t *ED DISTRICT COURT
Third Judicial District

JAMES A. VALDEZ #3308
Attorney for Defendant
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOCIATION
424 East 500 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 532-5444
E-mail: ivaldezfo),sllda.com

JUL 2 0 2000
SALT LAKE COUNTY
Deputy Clerk

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE DIVISION

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

ORDER QUASHING BINDOVER
AND REMANDING TO PRELIMINARY
HEARING MAGISTRATE.

v.
JOSE MORALES-TORRES
Defendant

CaseNo.001904616FS
CAO 00-00-5277
JUDGE WILLIAM BARRETT

The above-captioned matter having come on for hearing on the 20th of July, 2000, the
Defendant JOSE MORALES-TORRES, represented by his attorney James A. Valdez, the States
representative Deputy District Attomey, Kelly R. Sheffield.
The evidence presented was the Preliminary Hearing transcript, case law, Memorandums
and brief argument by attorneys.
The court having carefully read the transcript, memorandums and case law, finds that in
review of State v. Hester. 2000 UT App 159, (2000) released after the preliminary hearing in this
matter, the State has failed to so a "Quantum of Evidence" necessary to bind over, in that: (1) the
conversation that defendant had with a so called dealer was not understood by Officer Portel
because it was in the Spanish language and she did not understand what was said nor to whom;
(2) it was clear that defendant never had any drugs; (3) defendant never mention "cocaine or any
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other drug; (4) police officers broke off negotiations with defendant and he walked off;
officers made further contact with drug dealer(s) on their own, conducted negotiations and;
(6) there was no evidence that defendant had anything to do with the dealers that the officers
eventually consummated a drug transaction.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, that the bind over in the above entitled matter be Quashed
and the matter be remanded to the Magistrate Court for further hearing.

DATED this

[day of July, 2000.

WILLIAM BARRETT, JUDGE
THIRD DISTRICT COURT

APPROVED AS TO FORM:

ELLY RL SHEFFIELD

MAILED/DELIVERED a copy of the foregoing to the Office of the District Attorney,
231 East 400 South, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, this

day of July, 2000.
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DAVID E. YOCOM
District Attorney for Salt Lake County
KELLY R. SHEFFIELD, 5869
Deputy District Attorney
231 East 400 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801)363-7900
00005277
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,

ORDER OF DISMISSAL
Case No. 001904616

Plaintiff,

Hon. Anthony B Quinn

-vsJOSE MORALES-TORRES,
Defendant.

Based upon the motion of the Plaintiff and in the interests of justice,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the information in the above-entitled matter be
dismissed.

/

DATED this

$

day of August. 2000.
BYTHE COURT:
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing MOTION TO DISMISS and
ORDER OF DISMISSAL was delivered to James A Valdez, Attorney for Defendant Jose
Morales-Torres at 424 East 500 South, Suite 300, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 on the O
of August, 2000.
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